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ABSTRACT
Can effective international governance for artificial intelligence re-
main fragmented, or is there a need for a centralised international
organisation for AI? We draw on the history of other international
regimes to identify advantages and disadvantages in centralising AI
governance. Some considerations, such as efficiency and political
power, speak in favour of centralisation. Conversely, the risk of
creating a slow and brittle institution speaks against it, as does the
difficulty in securing participation while creating stringent rules.
Other considerations depend on the specific design of a centralised
institution. A well-designed body may be able to deter forum shop-
ping and ensure policy coordination. However, forum shopping
can be beneficial and a fragmented landscape of institutions can
be self-organising. Centralisation entails trade-offs and the details
matter. We conclude with two core recommendations. First, the
outcome will depend on the exact design of a central institution. A
well-designed centralised regime covering a set of coherent issues
could be beneficial. But locking-in an inadequate structure may
pose a fate worse than fragmentation. Second, for now fragmenta-
tion will likely persist. This should be closely monitored to see if it
is self-organising or simply inadequate.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In 2018, Canada and France proposed the International Panel on
Artificial Intelligence (IPAI). After being rejected at the G7 in 2019,
negotiations shifted to the OECD and are presently ongoing. As
the field of AI continues to mature and spark public interest and
legislative concern [41], the priority of such governance initiatives
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reflects the growing appreciation that AI has the potential to dra-
matically change the world for both good and ill [9]. Research into
AI governance needs to keep pace with policy-making and techno-
logical change. Choices made today may have long-lasting impacts
on policymakers’ ability to address numerous AI policy problems
[7]. Effective governance can promote safety, accountability, and re-
sponsible behaviour in the research, development, and deployment
of AI systems.
AI governance research to date has predominantly focused at the
national and sub-national levels [6, 16, 44]. Research into AI global
governance remains relatively nascent (though see [5]). Kemp et al.
[24] have called for specialised, centralised intergovernmental agen-
cies to coordinate policy responses globally, and others have called
for a centralised ‘International Artificial Intelligence Organisation’
[14]. Others favour more decentralised arrangements based around
‘Governance Coordinating Committees’, global standards, or exist-
ing international law instruments [8, 28, 47].
No one has taken a step back to inquire: what would the history
of multilateralism suggest, given the state and trajectory of AI?
Should AI governance be centralised or decentralised? ‘Centralisa-
tion’, in this case, refers to the degree to which the coordination,
oversight and/or regulation of a set of AI policy issues or technolo-
gies are housed under a single (global) institution. This is not a
binary choice; it exists across a spectrum. Trade is highly (but not
entirely) centralised under the umbrella of the WTO. In contrast,
environmental multilateralism is much more decentralised.
In this paper, we seek to help the community of researchers,
policymakers, and other stakeholders in AI governance understand
the advantages and disadvantages of centralisation. This may help
set terms and catalyse a much-needed debate to inform governance
design decisions. We first outline the international governance
challenges of AI, and review early proposed global responses. We
then draw on existing literatures on regime fragmentation [3] and
‘regime complexes’ [36] to assess considerations in centralising
the international governance of AI. We draw on the history of
other international regimes1 to identify considerations that speak
in favour or against designing a centralised regime complex for
AI. We conclude with two recommendations. First, many trade-offs
are contingent on how well-designed a central body would be. An
adaptable, powerful institution with a manageable mandate would
be beneficial, but a poorly designed body could prove a fate worse
1A regime is a set of ‘implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international
relations’[27, p.186].
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than fragmentation. Second, for now there should be structured
monitoring of existing efforts to see whether they are they are
self-organising or insufficient.
2 THE STATE OF AI GOVERNANCE
There is debate as to whether AI is a single policy area or a diverse
series of issues. Some claim that AI cannot be cohesively regulated
as it is a collection of disparate technologies, with different risk
profiles across different applications and industries [45]. This is an
important but not entirely convincing objection. The technical field
has no settled definition for ‘AI’,2 so it should be no surprise that
defining a manageable scope for AI governance will be difficult. Yet
this challenge is not unique to AI: definitional issues abound in areas
such as environment and energy, but have not figured prominently
in debates over centralisation. Indeed, energy and environment
ministries are common at the domestic level, despite problems in
setting the boundaries of natural systems and resources.
We contend that there are numerous ways in which a centralised
body could be designed for AI governance. For example, a cen-
tralised approach could carve out a subset of interlinked AI is-
sues to cover. This could involve focusing on the potentially high-
risk applications of AI systems, such as AI-enabled cyberwarfare,
lethal autonomous weapons (LAWS), other advanced military ap-
plications, or high-level machine intelligence (HLMI).3 Another
approach could govern underlying hardware resources (e.g. large-
scale compute resources) or software libraries. We are agnostic on
the specifics of how centralisation could or should be implemented,
and instead focus on the costs and benefits of centralisation in the
abstract. The exact advantages and disadvantages of centralisation
are likely to vary depending on the institutional design. This is
an important area of further study, particularly once more specific
proposals are put forward. However, such work must be grounded
in a higher-level investigation of trade-offs in centralising AI gov-
ernance. It is this foundational analysis which we seek to offer.
Numerous AI issues could benefit from international cooperation.
These include the potentially catastrophic applications mentioned
above. It also encompasses more quotidian uses, such as AI-enabled
cybercrime; human health applications; safety and regulation of
autonomous vehicles and drones; surveillance, privacy and data-
use; and labour automation. Multilateral coordination could also
use AI to tackle other global problems such as climate change [43],
or help meet the Sustainable Development Goals [46]. This is an
illustrative but not exhaustive list of international AI policy issues.
Global regulation across these issues is currently nascent, frag-
mented, yet evolving. A wide range of UN institutions have be-
gun to undertake some activities on AI [20]. The bodies covering
AI policy issues range across existing organisations including the
International Labour Organisation (ILO), International Telecom-
munication Union (ITU), and UNESCO. This is complemented by
budding regulations and working groups across the International
Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), International Maritime Or-
ganisation (IMO), International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO),
2We define ‘AI’ as any machine system capable of functioning ‘appropriately and with
foresight in its environment’ [34, p.13]; see too [9, p.5].
3‘High-level machine intelligence’ has been defined as ‘unaided machines [that] can
accomplish every task better and more cheaply than human workers’ [17, p.1].
and other bodies, as well as treaty amendments, such as the up-
dating of the Vienna Convention on Road Traffic to encompass
autonomous vehicles [28], or the ongoing negotiations at the Con-
vention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) on LAWS. The
UN System Chief Executives Board (CEB) for Coordination through
the High-Level Committee on Programmes has been empowered to
draft a system-wide AI capacity building strategy. The High-level
Panel on Digital Cooperation has also sought to gather together
common principles and ideas for AI relevant areas [19]. Whether
these initiatives bear fruit, however, remains questionable, as many
of the involved international organisations have fragmented mem-
bership, were not originally created to address AI issues and lack
effective enforcement or compliance mechanisms [32, p.2].
The trajectory of these initiatives matters. How governance is
initially organised can be central to its success. Debates over cen-
tralisation and fragmentation are long-lasting and prominent with
good reason. How we structure international cooperation can be
critical to its success, and most other debates often implicitly hinge
on structural debates. Fragmentation and centralisation exist across
a spectrum. In a world lacking a global government, some fragmen-
tation will always prevail. But the degree to which it prevails is
crucial. We define ‘fragmentation’ as a patchwork of international
organisations and institutions which focus on a particular issue
area, but differ in scope, membership and often rules [3, p.16]. We
define centralisation as an arrangement in which governance of a
particular issue lies under the authority of a single umbrella body. A
regime complex is a network of three or more international regimes
on a common issue area. These should have overlapping member-
ship and cause potentially problematic interactions [36, p.29]. These
definitions and terms are by nature normatively loaded. For exam-
ple, some may find ‘decentralisation’ to be a positive framing, while
others may see ‘fragmentation’ to possess negative connotations.
Recognising this, we seek to use these terms in a primarily analytical
manner. We will use findings from each of these theoretical areas to
inform our discussion of the history of multilateral fragmentation
and its implications for AI governance.
3 CENTRALISATION CRITERIA: HISTORY OF
GOVERNANCE TRADE-OFFS
In the following discussion, we explore a series of considerations for
AI governance. Political power and efficient participation support
centralisation. The breadth vs. depth dilemma, as well as slowness
and brittleness support decentralisation. Policy coordination and
forum shopping considerations can cut both ways.
3.1 Political Power
Regimes embody power in their authority over rules, norms, and
knowledge beyond states’ exclusive control. A more centralised
regime will see this power concentrated among fewer institutions.
A centralised, powerful architecture is likely to be more influential
against competing international organisations and with constituent
states [36, pp.36-7].
An absence of centralised authority to manage regime complexes
has presented challenges in the past. Across the proliferation of
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) there is no require-
ment to cede responsibility to the UN Environmental Programme
in the case of overlap or competition. This has led to turf wars,
inefficiencies and even contradictory policies [3]. One of the most
notable examples is that of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). HFCs are
potent greenhouse gases, and yet their use has been encouraged
by the Montreal Protocol since 1987 as a replacement for ozone-
depleting substances. This has only recently been resolved via the
2015 Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, which itself has
a prolonged implementation period. Similarly, the internet gover-
nance regime complex is diffuse. Multiple venues and norms govern
technical standards, cyber crime, human rights, and warfare [35].
Although the UN Internet Governance Forum (IGF) discusses sev-
eral cross-cutting issues, it does not have a mandate to consolidate
even principles, let alone negotiate new formal agreements [33].
In contrast, other centralised regimes have supported effective
management. For example, under the umbrella of the WTO, norms
such as the most-favoured-nation principle (equally treating all
WTO member states) principle have become the bedrock of in-
ternational trade. The power and track-record of the WTO is so
formidable that it has created a chilling effect: the fear of collid-
ing with WTO norms and rules has led environmental treaties to
self-censor and actively avoid discussing or deploying trade-related
measures [12]. Both the chilling effect and the remarkably powerful
application of common trade rules were not a marker of interna-
tional trade until the establishment of the WTO. The power of
these centralised body has stretched beyond influencing states in
the domain of trade, to moulding related issues.
Political power offers further benefits in governing emerging
technologies that are inherently uncertain in both substance and
policy impact. Uncertainty in technology and preferences has been
associatedwith some increased centralisation in regimes [25]. There
may also be benefits to housing a foresight capacity within the
regime complex, to allow for accelerated or even proactive efforts
[39]. Centralised AI governance would enable an empowered organ-
isation to more effectively use foresight analyses to inform policy
responses across the regime complex.
3.2 Supporting Efficiency & Participation
Decentralised AI governance may undermine efficiency and inhibit
participation. States often create centralised regimes to reduce costs,
for instance by eliminating duplicate efforts, yielding economies of
scale within secretariats, and simplifying participation [15]. Con-
versely, fragmented regimes may force states to spread resources
and funding over many distinct institutions, particularly limiting
the ability of less well-resourced states or parties to participate fully
[32, p.2].
Historically, decentralised regimes have presented cost and re-
lated participation concerns. Hundreds of related and sometimes
overlapping international environmental agreements can create
‘treaty congestion’ [1]. This complicates participation and imple-
mentation for both developed and developing nations [15]. This
includes costs associated with travel to different forums, monitor-
ing and reporting for a range of different bodies, and duplication of
effort by different secretariats (ibid.).
Similar challenges are already being witnessed in AI governance.
Simultaneous and globally distributed meetings pose burdensome
participation costs for civil society. Fragmented organisations must
duplicatively invest in high-demand machine learning subject mat-
ter experts to inform their activities. Centralisation would support
institutional efficiency and participation.
3.3 Slowness & Brittleness of Centralised
Regimes
One potential problem of centralisation lies in the relatively slow
process of establishing centralised institutions, which may often be
outpaced by the rate of technological change. Another challenge
lies in centralised institutions’ brittleness after they are established,
i.e., their vulnerability to regulatory capture, or failure to react to
changes in the problem landscape.
Establishing new international institutions is often a slow pro-
cess. For example, the Kyoto Protocol took three years of negoti-
ations to create and then another eight to enter into force. This
becomes even more onerous with higher participation and stakes.
Under the GATT, negotiations for a 26% cut in tariffs between 19
countries took 8 months in 1947. The Uruguay round, beginning in
1986, took 91 months to achieve a tariff reduction of 38% between
125 parties [31]. International law has been quick to respond to tech-
nological changes in some cases, and delayed in others [42, p.184].
Decentralised efforts may prove quicker to respond to complex,
‘transversal’ issues, if they rely more on informal institutions with
a smaller but like-minded membership [32, pp.2-3]. Centralised
AI governance may be particularly vulnerable to sparking lengthy
negotiations, because progress on centralised regimes for new tech-
nologies tends to be hard if a few states hold clearly unequal stakes
in the technology, or if there are significant differences in infor-
mation and expertise among states or between states and private
industry [42, pp.187-94]. Both these conditions closely match the
context of AI technology. Moreover, because AI technology de-
velops rapidly, such slow implementation of rules and principles
could lead to certain actors taking advantage by setting de facto
arrangements or extant state practice.
Even after its creation, a centralised regime can be brittle; the
very qualities that provide it with political power may exacerbate
the adverse effects of regulatory capture; the features that ensure
institutional stability, may also mean that the institution cannot
adapt quickly to unanticipated outside stressors outside its estab-
lished mission. The regime might break before it bends. The first
potential risk is regulatory capture. Given the high profile of AI
issue areas, political independence is paramount. However, as il-
lustrated by numerous cases, including undue corporate influence
in the WHO during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic [11], no institution
is fully immune to regime capture, and centralisation may reduce
the costs of lobbying, making capture easier by providing a single
locus of influence. On the other hand, a regime complex comprising
many parallel institutions could find itself vulnerable to capture by
powerful actors, who are better positioned than smaller parties to
send representatives to every forum.
Moreover, centralised regimes entail higher stakes. Many issues
are in a single basket and thus failure is more likely to be severe
if it does occur. International institutions can be notoriously path-
dependent and thus fail to adjust to changing circumstances, as
seen with the ILO’s considerable difficulties in reforming its partici-
pation and rulemaking processes in the 1990s [2]. The public failure
of a flagship global AI institution or governance effort could have
lasting political repercussions. It could strangle subsequent, more
well-conceived proposals in the crib, by undermining confidence
in multilateral governance generally or capable governance on AI
issues specifically. By contrast, for a decentralized regime complex
to similarly fail, all of its component institutions would need to
simultaneously ‘break’ or fail to innovate at once.4 A centralised
institution that does not outright collapse, but which remains inef-
fective, may become a blockade against better efforts.
Ultimately, brittleness is not an inherentweakness of centralisation–
and indeed depends far more on institutional design details. There
may be strategies to ‘innovation-proof’[29] governance regimes.
Periodic renegotiation, modular expansion, ‘principles based reg-
ulation’, or sunset clauses can also support ongoing reform [30,
pp.29-30]. Such approaches have often proved successful histor-
ically, due partially to decentralisation but, importantly, also to
particular designs.
3.4 The Breadth vs. Depth Dilemma
Pursuing centralisation may create an overly high threshold that
limits participation. All multilateral agreements face a trade-off
between having higher participation (‘breadth’) or stricter rules
and greater ambition of commitments (‘depth’). The dilemma is
particularly evident for centralised institutions that are intended to
be powerful and require strong commitments from states.
However, the opposite dynamics of sacrificing depth for breadth
can also pose risks. The 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change
was significantly watered down to allow for the legal participation
of the US. Anticipated difficulties in ratification through the Senate
led to negotiators opting for a ‘pledge and review’ structure with
few legal obligations. Thus, the US could join simply through the
approval of the executive [23]. In this case, inclusion of the US
(which at any rate proved temporary) came at the cost of significant
cutbacks on the demands which the regime sought to make of all
parties.
In contrast, decentralisation could allow for major powers to
engage in relevant regulatory efforts where they would be deterred
from signing up to a more comprehensive package. This has prece-
dence in the history of climate governance. Some claim that the
US-led Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate
helped, rather than hindered climate governance, as it bypassed
UNFCCC deadlock and secured non-binding commitments from
actors not bound by the Kyoto Protocol [49, pp.259-60].
This matters, as buy-in may prove a thorny issue for AI gover-
nance. The actors who lead in AI development include powerful
states that are potentially most adverse to global regulation in this
area. They have thus far proved recalcitrant in the global gover-
nance of security issues such as anti-personnel mines or cyberwar-
fare. In response, some have already recommended a critical-mass
governance approach to the military uses of AI. Rather than seeking
a comprehensive agreement, devolving and spinning off certain
components into separate treaties (e.g. for LAWS testing standards;
liability and responsibility; and limits to operational usage) could
instead allow for the powerful to ratify and move forward at least
a few of those options [48].
4We thank Nicolas Moës for this observation.
The breadth vs. depth dilemma is a trade-off in multilateral-
ism generally. However, it is a particularly pertinent challenge
for centralisation. The key benefit of a centralised body would
be to be a powerful anchor that ensures policy coordination and
coherence, without suffering fragmentation in membership. This
dilemma suggests it is unlikely to have both. It will likely need to
restrict membership to have teeth, or lose its teeth to have wide
participation. A critical mass approach may be able to deliver the
best of both worlds. Nonetheless these dilemma poses a difficult
knot for centralisation to unravel.
3.5 Forum Shopping
Forum shopping may help or hinder AI governance, depending
on the particular circumstances. Fragmentation enables actors to
choose where and how to engage. Such ‘forum shopping’ may take
one of several forms: moving venues, abandoning one organisation,
creating new venues, and working across multiple organisations to
sew competition between them [4]. Even when there is a natural
venue for an issue, actors have reasons to forum-shop. For instance,
states may look to maximise their influence, appease domestic
pressure [40] and placate constituents by shifting to a toothless
forum [18].
The ability to successfully forum-shop depends on an actor’s
power. Most successful examples of forum-shifting have been led
by the US [4]. Intellectual property rights in trade, for example,
was subject to prolonged, contentious forum shopping. Developed
states resisted attempts of the UN Conference on Trade and De-
velopment (UNCTAD) to address intellectual property rights in
trade by trying to push them onto the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) (ibid., 566) and then subsequently to theWTO
[18], overruling protests from developing states. Outcomes often
reflect power, but weak states and non-state actors can also pursue
forum shopping strategies in order to challenge the status-quo [22].
Forum shopping may help or hurt governance. This is evident in
current efforts to regulate LAWS.While the Group of Governmental
Experts has made some progress, on the whole the CCW has taken
slow deliberations on LAWS. In response, frustrated activists have
threatened to shift to another forum, as happened with the Ottawa
Treaty that banned landmines [10]. This strategy could catalyse
progress, but also brings risks of further forum shopping and weak
or unimplemented agreements. Forum shopping may similarly de-
lay, stall, or weaken regulation of time-sensitive AI policy issues,
including potential future HLMI development. It is plausible that
leading AI firms also have sway when they elect to participate in
some venues but not others. The OECD Expert Group on AI in-
cluded representatives from leading firms, whereas engagement at
UN efforts, including the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), do not
appear to be similarly prioritised. A decentralised regime will en-
able forum shopping, though further work is needed to determine
whether this will help or hurt governance outcomes on the whole.
3.6 Policy Coordination
There are good reasons to believe that either centralisation or frag-
mentation could enhance coordination. A centralised regime can
enable easier coordination both across and within policy issues,
acting as a focal point for states. Others argue that this is not always
the case, and that fragmentation can mutually supportive and even
more creative institutions.
Centralisation reduces the occurrence of conflicting mandates
and enables communication. These are the ingredients for policy
coherence. As noted previously, the WTO has been remarkably
successful in ensuring coherent policy and principles across the
realm of trade, and even into other areas such as the environment.
However, fragmented regimes can often act as complex adaptive
systems. Political requests and communication between secretariats
often ensures bottom-up coordination even in the absence of central-
isation. Multiple organisations have sought to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions within their respective remits, often at the behest
of the UNFCCC Conference of Parties. When effective, bottom-up
coordination can slowly evolve into centralisation. Indeed, this was
the case for the GATT and numerous regional, bilateral and sectoral
trade treaties, which all coalesced together into the WTO. While
this organic self-organisation has occurred, it has taken decades,
with forum shopping and inaction prevailing for many years.
Indeed, some have argued that decentralisation does not just
deliver ‘good enough’ global governance [38] that reflects a demand
for diverse principles in a multipolar world. Instead, they argue
‘polycentric’ governance approaches [37] may be more creative and
legitimate than centrally coordinated regimes. Arguments in favour
of polycentricity include the notion that it enables governance initia-
tives to begin having impacts at diverse scales, and that it enables
experimentation with diverse policies and approaches, learning
from experience and best practices (ibid., 552). Consequently, these
scholars assume âĂĲthat the invisible hand of a market of institu-
tions leads to a better distribution of functions and effectsâĂİ [50,
p.7].
It is unclear if the different bodies covering AI issues will self-
organise or collide. Many of the issues are interdependent and
will need to be addressed in tandem. Some particular policy-levers,
such as regulating computing power or data, will impact almost
all use areas, given that AI progress and use is closely tied to such
inputs. Numerous initiatives on AI and robotics are displaying loose
coordination [28], but it remains uncertain whether the virtues
of a free market of governance will prevail here. Great powers
can exercise monopsony-like influence in forum shopping, and the
supply of both computing power andmachine learning expertise are
highly concentrated. In sum, centralisation can reduce competition
and enhance coordination, but it may suffocate the creative self-
organisation of more fragmented arrangements over time.
4 DISCUSSION: WHATWOULD HISTORY
SUGGEST?
4.1 A Summary of Considerations
The multilateral track record and peculiarities of AI yield sugges-
tions and warnings for the future. A centralised regime could lower
costs, support participation, and act as a powerful new linchpin
within the international system. Yet centralisation presents risks for
AI governance. It could simply produce a brittle dinosaur, of sym-
bolic value but with little meaningful impact on underlying political
or technological issues. A poorly executed attempt could lock-in a
poorly designed centralised body: a fate worse than fragmentation.
Accordingly, ongoing efforts at the UN, OECD, and elsewhere could
benefit from addressing the considerations presented in this paper,
a summary of which is presented in Appendix A.
4.2 The Limitations of ‘Centralisation vs.
Decentralisation’ Debates
Structure is not a panacea. Specific provisions such as agendas and
decision-making procedures matter greatly, as do the surrounding
politics. Underlying political will may be impacted by framing or
connecting policy issues [26, pp.770-1]. The success of a regime is
not just a result of fragmentation, but of design details.
Moreover, institutions can be dynamic and broaden over time by
taking in new members, or deepen in strengthening commitments.
Successful multilateral efforts, such as trade and ozone depletion,
tend to do both. We are in the early days of global AI governance.
Decisions taken early on will constrain and partially determine the
future path. This dependency can even take place across regimes.
The Kyoto Protocol was largely shaped by the targets and timeta-
bles approach of the Montreal Protocol, which in turn drew from
the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution. This
targets and timetables approach continues today in the way that
most countries frame their climate pledges to the Paris Agreement.
The choices we make on governing short-term AI challenges will
likely shape the management of other policy issues in the long term
[7].
On the other hand, committing to centralisation, even if success-
ful, may amount to solving the wrong problem. The problem may
not be structural, but geopolitical. Centralisation could even exac-
erbate the problem by diluting scarce political attention, incurring
heavy transaction costs, and shifting discussions away from bodies
which have accumulated experience and practice [21]. For example,
the Bretton Woods Institutions of the IMF and World Bank, joined
later by the WTO, are centralised regimes that engender power.
However, those institutions had the express support of the US and
may have simply manifested state power in institutional form. Ef-
forts to ban LAWS and create a cyberwarfare convention have been
broadly opposed by states with an established technological supe-
riority in these areas [13]. A centralised regime may not unpick
these power struggles, but just add a layer of complexity.
5 LESSONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Our framework provides a tool for policy-makers to inform their
decisions of whether to join, create, or forgo new institutions that
tackle AI policy problems. For instance, the recent choice of whether
to support the creation of an independent IPAI involved these con-
siderations. Following the US veto, ongoing negotiations for its
replacement at the OECDmay similarly benefit from their consider-
ation. For now, it is worth closely monitoring the current landscape
of AI governance to see if it exhibits enough policy coordination
and political power to effectively deal with mounting AI policy
problems. While there are promising initial signs [28] there are also
already growing governance failures in LAWS, cyberwarfare, and
elsewhere.
We outline a suggested monitoring method in Table 1. There
are three key areas to monitor: conflict, coordination, and catalyst.
First, conflict should measure the extent to which principles, rules,
regulations and other outcomes from different bodies in the AI
Table 1: Regime Complex Monitoring Suggestions
Key theme Question Methods
Conflict To what extent are regimes’ principles and outputs in opposition over time? Expert and practitioner survey
Network analysis (e.g, citation network clustering and centrality)
Natural Language Processing (e.g., entailment and fact checking)
Coordination Are regimes taking steps to complement each other?
Catalyst Is the regime complex self-organizing to proactively fill governance gaps?
regime complex undermine or contradict each other or are in ten-
sion either in their principles or goals. Second, coordination seeks
to measure the proactive steps that AI-related regimes take to work
with each other. This includes liaison relationships, joint initiatives,
as well as the extent to which their rules, outputs and principles
tend to reinforce one another. Third, catalyst raises the important
question of governance gaps: is the regime complex self-organising
to proactively address international AI policy problems? Numerous
AI policy problems currently have no clear coverage under interna-
tional law, including AI-enabled cyber warfare and HLMI. Whether
this changes is of vital importance.
These areas require investigation through multiple methods.
Qualitative surveys of relevant organisations and actors can yield
data on expert perceptions of these questions. Surveys can be aug-
mented with quantitative methods, including network analyses
of the regime complex relations [36, p.32]. Natural language pro-
cessing could be used to examine contradictions and similarities
between different regime outputs, e.g., statements, meeting min-
utes, and more. Monitoring the outcomes of fragmentation can help
to determine whether centralisation is needed. One way forward
would be to empower the OECD AI Policy Observatory or the UN
CEB to regularly review the monitoring outcomes. This could in-
form a democratic discussion and decision of whether to centralise
AI governance further.
Our framework and discussion may also be useful for non-state
actors. Researchers and leading AI firms can play an important role
in sharing technical expertise and informing forecasts of new policy
problems on the horizon. The considerations may benefit their deci-
sions of where to engage. Civil society has a key role as participants,
watch-dogs, and catalysts. For example, the Campaign to Stop Killer
Robots has sought to boost engagement and support for a LAWS
ban within the CCW. Given prolonged delays and a pessimistic out-
look, some have articulated a strategy of creating an entirely new
forum for the ban, inspired by the Ottawa Treaty which outlawed
landmines. Our framework can help reveal the potential virtues
(allowing for progress while avoiding high-threshold deadlocks)
and vices (enabling forum shopping) of such an approach. It could
even help inform the structure of a future international institution,
such as allowing for a modular, flexible structure with ‘critical mass’
agreements. One cross-cutting consideration is clear: a fractured
regime sees higher participation costs that may threaten to exclude
many civil society organisations altogether.
The international governance of AI is nascent and fragmented.
Centralisation under a well-designed, modular, ‘innovation-proof’
framework organisation may be a desirable solution. However, such
a move must be approached with caution. How to define its scope
and mandate is one problem. Ensuring a politically-acceptable and
well-designed body is perhaps a more daunting one. It risks cement-
ing in place a fate worse than fragmentation. Monitoring conflict
and coordination in the current AI regime complex, and whether
governance gaps are filled, is a prudent way of knowing whether
the existing structure can suffice. For now we should closely watch
the trajectory of both AI technology and its governance initiatives
to determine whether centralisation is worth the risk.
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A SUMMARY OF CONSIDERATIONS
Consideration Implications for
Centralisation
Historical Example AI Policy Issue Example
Political Power Pro Shaping other regimes: WTO has created a
chilling effect, where the fear of conflicting
with WTO norms and rules has led environ-
mental treaties to self-censor to avoid address-
ing trade-related measures.
Empowered regime using foresight on AI sys-
tems development can address policy prob-
lems more quickly.
Efficiency
& Participation
Pro Decentralisation raises inefficiencies and barri-
ers: The proliferation of multilateral environ-
mental agreements poses costs and barriers to
participation in negotiation, implementation,
and monitoring.
AI companies engage and share expertise, but
if not checked by adversarial civil society,
there is a greater concern of regulatory cap-
ture; increased costs undermine civil society
participation.
Slowness
& Brittleness
Con Slowness:Under the GATT, 1947 tariff negotia-
tions among 19 countries took 8 months. The
Uruguay round, beginning in 1986, took 91
months for 125 parties to agree on reductions.
Regulatory capture: WHO accused of-
for undue corporate influence in response to
2009 H1N1 pandemic.
Pathology of path-dependence: Failed
ILO reform attempts.
Process of centralised regime can not keep
pace with high speed of AI progress and
deployment, may miss the window of
opportunity.
Advanced AI issues (especially HLMI) may
rapidly shift the risk landscape or problem
portfolio of AI, beyond the narrow scope of
an older institutional mandate
Breadth vs. Depth
Dilemma
Con Watering down: 2015 Paris Agreement sug-
gest attempts to ‘get all parties on board’ to
centralized regime may result in significant
watering down.
Attempts to effectively govern the military
uses of AI have been resisted by the most
powerful states.
Attempted to create an IPAI have been
resisted by the US and shifted to a smaller
forum (the OECD).
Forum
Shopping
Depends on
design
Power predicts outcomes:
Intellectual property in trade shifted from
UNCTAD to WIPO to WTO, with developed
countries getting their way.
Accelerates progress: NGOs and some
states shifted discussions of anti-personnel
mines ban away from CCW, ultimately
resulting in the Ottawa Treaty.
Governance of military AI systems is frac-
tured across CCW, multiple GGEs. This strat-
egy may catalyze progress, but brings risks
of fracture.
Policy
Coordination
Depends on
design
Strong, but delayed convergence:
Diverse regimes can coalesce into centralized
regime, as seen with GATT and numerous
trade treaties coalescing into the WTO, but
doing so may take many decades.
Numerous AI governance initiatives display
loose coordination, but it is unclear if these
initiatives can respond to policy develop-
ments in a timely manner.
